©Adil Kaibaliev

Abstract

The political history of independent Kyrgyzstan has been shaped not only by changes of presidents, constitutional models and political parties, but also by the persistent reproduction of informal group loyalties capable of subordinating formal institutions to personal, kinship, regional and patronal interests. The theoretical framework of this analysis combines the destructive form of Ibn Khaldun’s concept of ʿaṣabiyyah—defined here as blind group fanaticism—with contemporary theories of institutions, patronal politics, state capacity and state breakdown. Modernization does not eliminate this mechanism; it changes the organizational forms through which it operates. Loyalties historically rooted in kinship and tribal relations can be reproduced through party, regional, organizational, business and personal networks. As a result, programmatic political competition can be transformed into competition among groups for control over state institutions and resources.

President Sadyr Japarov’s address at the opening of the Yrys Ordo State Congress Center provides a public case in which this problem was articulated directly. Representatives of the political generation that shaped thirty-five years of independence were brought together in one setting; the president identified demagoguery, mutual accusations, regional division and political rivalry as recurring problems and then shifted the principal normative emphasis toward the younger generation (Japarov, 2026). In such a system, preserving statehood requires not the elimination of political competition, but the subordination of particularistic group loyalties to a common state order, the preservation of a single lawful center of authority and a gradual transition from personal consolidation to durable institutional continuity.

Keywords: Kyrgyzstan, Sadyr Japarov, Ibn Khaldun, blind group fanaticism, patronal politics, state capacity, political mobilization, institutional continuity.

The opening of the Yrys Ordo State Congress Center on August 24, 2026 carried significance well beyond the ceremonial inauguration of a new state facility.

Gathered in one hall were representatives of nearly the entire political era of independent Kyrgyzstan—figures who had participated in governing the country at different points over the previous thirty-five years. Sadyr Japarov acknowledged their contribution to the formation of the state while placing the national interest above political views and personal ambitions (Japarov, 2026).

The subsequent turn towardы the younger generation gave the address a distinctly political and normative character, linking an assessment of the past to the question of future institutional continuity.

In describing Kyrgyzstan’s political experience since independence, Japarov used the collective pronoun “we,” explicitly including himself in a generation that had spent thirty-five years engaged in disputes, demagoguery, populism, mutual accusations and divisions between north and south. The younger generation was urged not to reproduce these practices, to preserve unity and to continue building a strong Kyrgyzstan (Japarov, 2026).

The central proposition of the address was stated as follows:

“The new Kyrgyzstan we are building does not belong to one person or one government.”

This formulation separates the state from the personality of the incumbent leader and simultaneously transfers responsibility for preserving what has been achieved to society. If state institutions, infrastructure and economic potential belong to society as a whole, political stability can no longer be treated as the exclusive responsibility of the government in office; it becomes a matter of collective responsibility.

Analytically, this meaning can be expressed in the following formula:

Do not defend only me. Defend what belongs to you.

This formulation moves the analysis beyond a single speech and raises a broader question: how groups acquire political power, why they may fragment after obtaining it, how informal loyalties penetrate modern institutions and under what conditions competition among elites begins to erode the state order itself.

More than six centuries ago, this mechanism was conceptualized through ʿaṣabiyyah (Arabic: العصبية) (Ibn Khaldūn, 1989). The present analysis focuses on its destructive political form, referred to here as blind group fanaticism.

In Ibn Khaldun’s political theory, membership in a group is a source of collective power. The critical transition for the present analysis occurs when a natural attachment to “one’s own” becomes unconditional support for the group regardless of whether its actions are justified or harmful to the state.

The concept of ʿaṣabiyyah (العصبية) is historically associated with kinship and tribal attachment to one’s own group. Within Islamic political thought, natural group bonds can be distinguished from their destructive consequences when they take the form of blind chauvinism—an uncritical partiality toward one’s own group (Hashmi, 2003). This article uses the term blind group fanaticism for that destructive form: unconditional adherence to one’s lineage, tribe, party, organization, political group, or leader even when its actions conflict with objective right, the common good, or the interests of the state (Hashmi, 2003).

The sources of such group attachment are not limited to biological kinship. Relationships functionally similar to kinship can also arise among allies, clients and people bound together by durable mutual dependence and obligations (Ibn Khaldūn, 1989). Blind group fanaticism can therefore form not only through blood ties, but also around political, organizational, regional, or personal affiliation.

This proposition is essential to the analysis of contemporary forms of political loyalty.

Tribal organization provided the historical setting in which this mechanism developed, but in modern society it can be reproduced around a party, organization, region, business network, or political leader. In a traditional social order, the structure can be represented as follows:

Figure 1

In contemporary society, the same logic can take different organizational forms (Figure 2).

Figure 2

Organizational forms and communication technologies change, but the underlying political logic can remain intact: belonging to “one’s own” becomes an independent basis for support, regardless of the objective merits of the group’s position. At that point, group attachment takes the form of blind group fanaticism.

A cohesive group can convert internal loyalty into political force and a drive for power (Ibn Khaldūn, 2026, pp. 284–286). In its destructive form, this mechanism becomes blind group fanaticism: the group acquires the capacity to mobilize supporters not around objective right or the state interest, but around the fact of belonging itself.

Blind group fanaticism is therefore not merely a cultural remnant; it is a durable mechanism for generating and mobilizing political power.

Modernization cannot be reduced to a linear replacement of lineage by citizenship, tribe by party, or personal loyalty by impersonal institutions. Modern formal structures can coexist with durable informal networks of trust and obligation.

A contemporary political party may possess a charter, a central committee, regional branches, a program and legal status while simultaneously operating through highly informal networks of trust and reciprocal obligation.

Clans in Central Asia function as informal organizations grounded in kinship and fictive-kinship ties and can exert substantial influence on political regimes even within modern state institutions (Collins, 2004). Formal modernization does not automatically eliminate such structures (Collins, 2004).

Clan ties can perform a contradictory function: they generate trust and social protection within the group while simultaneously creating potential lines of political conflict between groups (Collins, 2003).

Contemporary blind group fanaticism therefore cannot be identified only where political actors openly invoke lineage or tribe.

In political practice, the mechanism appears when the criteria of evaluation shift. Questions about professional competence or the content of a party program give way to questions of belonging: “our person” or “not one of us,” “our group” or “their group,” “our leader” or “their leader.” Under such conditions, an institution may retain a formally modern organizational shell while its internal logic becomes increasingly governed by group loyalty.

The formal modernity of an institution, therefore, does not preclude the reproduction of blind group fanaticism within it.

Modern organizational form does not end internal fragmentation; it creates a broader structure within which new centers of unconditional loyalty can emerge. Within a party, these may include leader-centered groups, regional networks, kinship circles, financial groups, networks controlling appointments and groups oriented toward a particular patron (Figure 3).

Figure 3

This pattern is not unique to Kyrgyzstan. Personal and patronal political networks exist in many political systems. Their significance is especially pronounced where formal institutions remain too weak to make impersonal rules more consequential than personal relationships.

Such systems are commonly analyzed through the concept of patronal politics. Political actors operating within them orient themselves not only toward constitutional rules or party programs, but also toward personal networks of reciprocal obligation, access to resources and expectations about which network will gain control of the political center (Hale, 2005, 2011). In this environment, blind group fanaticism becomes multilayered.

The mechanism operates not in place of the institution, but inside it.

This produces one of the central paradoxes of political modernization: the state can develop increasingly sophisticated formal structures while simultaneously reproducing within them an informal logic of group loyalty.

The political history of independent Kyrgyzstan provides a particularly revealing setting in which to examine this mechanism.

Over thirty-five years, the country has repeatedly changed presidents, constitutional models, the distribution of authority between president and parliament, party configurations and the rules governing the formation of state institutions.

Changes in formal institutional architecture have not always eliminated informal competition among groups. Under the presidential systems of the Akaev and Bakiev periods, access to lucrative state positions and resources was concentrated to a substantial degree around the presidential center (Engvall, 2018). Following the 2010 constitutional reform, parliament and political parties gained considerably greater influence, but the patronal logic did not disappear; it became more dispersed and shifted into the party-coalition system, including competition over state offices and resources (Engvall, 2018).

The decentralization of personal power can therefore produce not the disappearance of patronalism, but its distribution across several competing networks.

Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary period from 2010 to 2020 was marked by persistent personalism, weak party institutionalization and patronal relationships. Political parties often functioned as personal political projects, while support networks could also be organized around clan ties (Isaacs, 2024).

The fundamental question for Kyrgyzstan’s political system is therefore not simply whether power should be concentrated in a strong presidency or a strong parliament, but how formal institutions relate to the informal networks operating within them.

The events of 2005 are particularly important for understanding the mechanisms of mass mobilization in Kyrgyzstan. They cannot be explained solely as an abstract mass movement of civil society: local elites, informal ties and the coordination of dispersed protests by opposition and business groups played substantial roles (Radnitz, 2006). A coalition of political and business elites helped transform local protests into a movement that brought down the government (Radnitz, 2006). The existence of genuine public discontent does not erase the analytical distinction between discontent itself and its political organization.

Transforming public discontent into organized political power requires leadership, organizational structure, resources, channels of communication, a shared interpretation of the conflict, identification of a political opponent and an expectation regarding how power will be distributed after victory.

Under such conditions, public discontent can be converted into a mobilizational resource for politically organized group loyalty (Radnitz, 2006).

Post-Soviet political transformations display recurring regime cycles in which formal changes of power do not necessarily eliminate the underlying structure of informal politics (Hale, 2005). New coalitions can reproduce the same mechanisms of personal coordination previously used by their predecessors (Hale, 2005).

A change of government can therefore remove a particular political group without changing blind group fanaticism as a principle of political behavior.

A new leader, political group, public rhetoric, or distribution of state positions does not amount to a change in political logic if competing networks remain primarily focused on capturing the center of power. Leaders can change within a short period; durable norms of political behavior require a much longer process of institutional change (Hale, 2005; North, 1991).

Institutions are humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They encompass formal rules—constitutions, laws and property rights—as well as informal constraints, including customs, traditions, sanctions, behavioral norms and codes of interaction (North, 1991).

Formal rules can be changed relatively quickly, whereas informal norms and durable patterns of trust and personal loyalty evolve much more slowly. A new constitutional architecture or a newly created party therefore does not, by itself, eliminate patronal networks or complete an institutional transformation (North, 1991).

Institutional change is gradual: institutions connect the past, present and future, while an established historical trajectory continues to shape subsequent political development (North, 1991). This helps explain why a state may repeatedly change its formal political structure while reproducing the same informal mechanisms.

Political development is determined not only by the competitiveness of a political system, but also by the state’s capacity to make and implement collectively binding decisions.

The quality of executive government is closely related to state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy. State capacity requires resources, professional competence and organizational structures that enable the state to implement decisions in practice (Fukuyama, 2013). In the Yrys Ordo address, the public financing of Yrys Ordo and Bishkek Arena, together with Kyrgyzstan’s ability to undertake major infrastructure and social projects with its own resources, was presented as evidence of expanded state capability (Japarov, 2026).

These projects are not, by themselves, comprehensive proof of the quality of governance. In the political context examined here, however, they function as material indicators of the state’s capacity to concentrate resources, make decisions and carry major projects through to completion.

Material outcomes thus become one observable dimension of state capacity and allow political promises to be compared with the actual implementation of decisions.

The political scene at Yrys Ordo brought together figures representing nearly the entire history of independent Kyrgyzstan. Japarov acknowledged the contribution of those present while including himself in a collective assessment of that generation’s political experience through the pronoun “we” (Japarov, 2026).

Within this collective characterization, demagoguery, populism, mutual accusations and division between north and south were identified as recurring practices of political behavior during the independence period (Japarov, 2026).

The object of criticism in this passage is therefore not a specific group of former leaders, but a broader pattern of political conduct associated with an entire generation.

The appeal to the younger generation moves the assessment of the past into the domain of political continuity. Young people are urged not to reproduce the negative practices of the previous generation, to preserve the capacity for unity on matters of national importance and to continue building a strong Kyrgyzstan (Japarov, 2026).

Analytically, political maturity in this context requires the ability to distinguish genuine public discontent from its political exploitation; reform of the state from competition for control of the state; institutional opposition from the mobilization of blind group fanaticism in the interests of particular political forces; and lawful leadership succession from the destruction of the center of state authority.

Mass political mobilization requires new participants, organizational energy and mechanisms of involvement. Political maturity among the younger generation is therefore measured not by political passivity, but by the capacity to assess whose interests are served and what institutional consequences follow from a proposed form of collective action.

In a political system where institutionalization remains incomplete, the role of the national leader is objectively greater than in a system whose core state mechanisms can function reliably regardless of the individual who occupies the highest office.

The younger generation therefore requires sincere loyalty to the lawful head of state who preserves the unity and continuity of the state order, together with the political maturity to distinguish efforts to improve the state from attempts by particular groups to possess it. Such loyalty is compatible with institutional criticism and demands for the correction of errors; the essential distinction lies between correcting public policy and dismantling the system of state governance itself.

Why States Collapse: Fragmentation of the Sovereign Center

Political disagreement, the existence of opposition and even a severe political crisis do not in themselves constitute state collapse. The critical condition is whether a single recognized center of ultimate state authority continues to exist.

A political community can contain several competing group centers, but there must be a superior force capable of integrating them into a common order (Ibn Khaldūn, 1989). When several centers of blind group fanaticism simultaneously claim supremacy and cease to recognize a common state center, political competition shifts toward fragmentation and internal conflict.

Statehood therefore presupposes a hierarchy of political loyalties. A lineage, party, regional identity, opposition organization, or business group can exist as an autonomous form of association, but none should acquire greater political significance than the common state order. Once that hierarchy is reversed, competition within the state becomes a struggle over who has the right to define state sovereignty itself.

Unity of Sovereign Decision-Making

Within this logic, state authority functions as the mechanism that terminates internal struggles among groups and establishes a common order (Ibn Khaldūn, 1989).

In the modern state, this principle is expressed through the unity of sovereignty: ultimate political decisions must emanate from a recognized constitutional center and be implemented through the system of state institutions.

Independent courts, parliament, local self-government, political parties and civil society organizations may possess substantial autonomy. Yet the parallel existence of several centers, each claiming that its own decisions supersede those of the state, shifts political conflict from institutional competition into coercive rivalry.

Contemporary Theory of Political Order

Control over violence occupies a central place in theories of political order. Stable political systems emerge when influential groups have sufficient incentives not to use violence against one another and instead operate within a common political order (North et al., 2009).

Statehood, therefore, does not imply the absence of powerful groups. It implies a mechanism that confines their competition within common rules. When elites compete for elections, offices, legislation and public support, politics remains institutional. When they create parallel centers of coercion and cease to recognize a common order, state erosion begins.

Tajikistan: When Institutions Fragment into Competing Groups

Central Asia provides a direct historical example of such fragmentation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, competition among local elites in Tajikistan gradually penetrated the state security apparatus. Unlike Uzbekistan, where the coercive apparatus retained much greater organizational coherence, Tajikistan’s security structures fragmented under conditions of elite competition. This process contributed to the fragmentation of coercive institutions, state breakdown and the civil war of 1992–1997 (Markowitz, 2013).

The Tajik experience demonstrates that state breakdown can develop even while state bodies continue to exist formally. The fragmentation of coercive institutions and their incorporation into competition among local elites weakened unified subordination to the central state and became one mechanism contributing to state collapse and the 1992–1997 civil war (Markowitz, 2013).

Institutional Erosion as a Precursor to State Breakdown

State erosion begins inside institutions long before formal state structures disappear. An agency can retain its legal status while losing its impersonal state character if it effectively begins to serve a particular political or regional network. When a territorial police unit is subordinated to a local group, or a ministry becomes a resource of a political network, the unified state character of the institution is weakened.

A parliamentary institution is weakened in the same way when it is used primarily as a mechanism for distributing resources among patronal networks.

State erosion therefore begins well before a country displays the full features commonly associated with a failed state. The critical threshold is reached when the formal institution ceases to be stronger than the group operating within it.

Where institutionalization remains incomplete, the head of state can perform a coordinating function that, in more mature systems, is distributed to a much greater degree across durable institutions.

This function includes maintaining the unity of the executive, providing strategic coordination, subordinating the administrative system to national decisions, balancing competing groups and limiting inter-elite struggles over individual components of the state apparatus.

This creates an institutional paradox. The long-term objective of a strong state is to reduce dependence on any particular individual; yet during an intermediate phase of consolidation, a leader may serve as the central mechanism for integrating fragmented centers of power.

Destroying such a center before institutional construction is complete does not guarantee stronger institutions and may instead open political space to competing centers of blind group fanaticism. Under those conditions, the object of political struggle ceases to be the improvement of the existing order and becomes control over the political space left vacant.

Personalization and Premature Deconsolidation: Two Risks of Institutional Transition

Institutional transition contains two opposing risks: excessive personalization and premature deconsolidation.

Under excessive personalization, the state system becomes so dependent on a single leader that his departure creates problems of functionality and continuity.

Under premature deconsolidation, central authority weakens before impersonal institutions have acquired the capacity to assume its coordinating functions automatically.

Sustainable state-building requires a gradual transition from personal consolidation to institutionalization. A strong leader must leave behind not only political and material achievements, but also a system capable of reproducing the state order after his departure. The final assessment of a period of state-building therefore depends not only on results achieved under an incumbent leader, but also on the capacity of the system to preserve those results after a transfer of power.

The Political Responsibility of the Next Generation

Japarov’s statement that the new Kyrgyzstan “does not belong to one person or one government” transfers the question of ownership of the state from the personal to the public sphere (Japarov, 2026).

This distinction means that the replacement of a president, government, or political party should not place the existence or continuity of the state itself in question.

The appeal to young people thus links political inheritance of the country to responsibility for preserving and developing the common state order.

Political maturity in future crises requires evaluating not only the shortcomings of the government in office, but also the institutional consequences of the proposed alternative: who will make decisions after a transfer of power, which institutions will remain intact and whether public discontent is being used to transfer control of the state from one political network to another.

Within this logic, Yrys Ordo becomes a material component of the broader political argument about state capacity.

The public financing of major infrastructure projects and the ability to implement them with domestic resources were presented by the president as evidence of the state’s increased capacity for independent action (Japarov, 2026).

Combined with the presence of representatives of the independence-era political generation, this created a symbolic link between the assessment of earlier political experience and the demonstration of current governing outcomes.

Analytically, this construction combines three elements: a historical assessment of a political generation, a material result produced by the current system and the transfer of responsibility to the generation that will inherit the state.

In an authorial reconstruction, the political meaning of the scene can be expressed in the following formula, which is not a literal quotation from the president:

I have shown you what we were able to build. If you return to the old ways, history will show what you are able to destroy.

In this context, the title “The President Said Goodbye” does not refer to an announcement of departure. It refers to a symbolic separation of the state from the personality of the incumbent leader.

The political meaning of this “farewell” lies in recognizing the limits of personal political time and transferring responsibility for preserving the state order to society and the next generation.

The state, in this construction, is not defined as the property of the government in office; its stability is expected to survive the replacement of a particular leader.

For the older political generation, this implies responsibility for the consequences of returning to earlier patterns of demagoguery, regional division and competition for the center of power. For the younger generation, it implies responsibility not to become the mobilizational resource of such a struggle.

Those who dismantle an existing order simultaneously assume responsibility for the quality of the political order that emerges after it.

Political action must be evaluated not only by its stated objectives, but also by the condition of the state before, during and after political transformation. Criticism of an incumbent government should therefore be accompanied by an analysis of the institutional alternative and its capacity to reproduce or improve core state functions.

The existence of shortcomings in the current system does not by itself establish the superiority of any alternative. Likewise, the popularity of a slogan or the scale of political mobilization is not evidence of the institutional capacity of the political order that may follow.

The resilience of the state depends on its ability to mobilize resources, make and implement decisions, provide security and legal order, develop infrastructure, fulfill international obligations, maintain administrative continuity and transfer power without destroying accumulated state capacity.

The political responsibility of the next generation therefore lies not in passivity, but in preventing a legitimate desire to improve the state from being converted into an instrument through which another cohesive political group seeks to possess the state itself.

The mechanism described more than six centuries ago continues to operate in modern politics: people form groups, develop mutual loyalty and convert that loyalty into political power (Ibn Khaldūn, 1989). The problem arises when belonging to “one’s own” becomes more important than right, law and the interests of the state. At that point, blind group fanaticism takes shape. Once one group reaches power, new lines of division can emerge within it and narrower centers of blind group fanaticism begin to compete for influence and resources. Statehood is preserved when public institutions can subordinate these competing loyalties to a common political order. Fragmentation begins when blind group fanaticism becomes stronger than the common state center. Modern parties and organizations have not eliminated this pattern; they have created new organizational forms through which it can operate.

Post-Soviet politics remains organized to a significant degree through patronal relationships and personal networks (Hale, 2005, 2011). Local elites and informal ties played a substantial role in the mobilization of 2005 (Radnitz, 2006). Shifting the political center from a presidential system to a parliamentary one did not eliminate competition over state resources; it changed the organizational form of that competition (Engvall, 2018). Informal institutions are highly persistent and tend to change more slowly than formal rules (North, 1991). State capacity depends on the actual ability of the state to implement its decisions (Fukuyama, 2013). Stable political order requires intergroup competition and violence to be constrained by common rules (North et al., 2009). The penetration of inter-elite competition into the state apparatus can fragment the state itself, as the experience of Tajikistan demonstrates (Markowitz, 2013).

Within this theoretical framework, Sadyr Japarov’s Yrys Ordo address marks a transition from a collective assessment of the political past to responsibility for the future. The president placed himself within a generation shaped by internal political conflict, linked the current period to material outcomes of state governance and identified the younger generation as the inheritor of the new Kyrgyzstan (Japarov, 2026).

The central political conclusion follows from this analysis: over time, the state order must become more durable than the personality of any particular leader. Yet where institutionalization remains incomplete, society must account for the cost of dismantling a lawful center of authority. The younger generation therefore requires sincere loyalty to a lawful head of state who preserves the unity and continuity of the state order, together with the political maturity to distinguish the improvement of the state from the struggle of particular groups to possess it.

If the country again confronts demagoguery, political division and competition for the center of power, responsibility will be judged not only by the motives of those involved, but by the consequences of their actions for the preservation of the state. In this sense, the article’s concluding formula retains its force: history will hold you accountable next.

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